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THE PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF A PREMISES SEARCH
INCIDENT TO ARREST UNDER CHIMEL v.
CALIFORNIA: DIVERGENT DEFINITIONS OF
"IMMEDIATE CONTROL" PLAGUE
THE LOWER COURTS
I. INTRODUCTION
In Chimel v. California' the United States Supreme Court reiterated
its position that "in the absence of well recognized exceptions" 2 a
warrantless search is per se unreasonable 3 and hence violative of fourth
amendment4 protections. The more controversial aspect of the Court's
1. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
2. Id. at 763. Among the recognized exceptions to the search warrant require-
ment are: searches incident to arrest (see note 6 infra); items falling into "plain view"
(Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); see Comment, "Plain View"-
Anything But Plain: Coolidge Divides the Lower Courts, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 489
(1974)); searches made in "hot pursuit" of a felon (Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967)); searches of automobiles and other vehicles (Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970); see note 16 infra); and searches necessitated by exigent circumstances (Vale v.
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.
1974)). There is some authority in federal courts of appeals cases which suggests the
development of what may be termed a "second-glance" exception to the warrant
requirement. That is, once an item has been exposed to government view under
unobjectionable circumstances and no further intrusion is involved, it cannot be argued
that a subsequent seizure of the same item is unconstitutional since any expectation of
privacy has been dissipated. See United States v. Grill, 484 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 989 (1974); Westover v. United States, 394 F.2d 164 (9th Cir.
1968); Evalt v. United States, 382 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1967); cf. United States v. Cohn,
472 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1973). See also United States v. Jenkins, 496 F.2d 57, 73 (2d
Cir. 1974).
3. 395 U.S. at 760-62. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-58 (1967);
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948); Trupiano v. United States,
334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948), overruled, United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
Trupiano held that "in seizing goods and articles, law enforcement agents must secure
and use search warrants whenever reasonably practicable." 334 U.S. at 705. The
language in Chimel requiring a warrant unless the search falls within a judicially
recognized exception is a restatement of the principle of Trupiano, but falls short of
adopting the standard set forth therein. See United States v. Allende, 486 F.2d 1351,
1352-53 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 958 (1974). But cf. 17 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 626, 634 (1970). The Katz formulation has been subsequently affirmed by the
Supreme Court. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589 (1974); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
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opinion was its analysis and limitation of the area surrounding an
arrestee which lawfully may be searched pursuant to the search inci-
dent to arrest exception to the warrant requirement.6 The Court ex-
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
5. See, e.g., Carrington, Chimel v. California-A Police Response, 45 NorR= DAME
LAw. 559 (1970), wherein the author states:
It is submitted that the majority opinion in [Chimel] is so overbroad that: (1)
the most conscientious policeman, desiring to act properly, in many cases simply
cannot know whether his conduct is proper or not; and (2) any judge applying
Chimel to a given case has such latitude for interpretation that almost any arrest-
based search could be held to be a Chimel violation if the sitting judge saw fit to
do so.
Id. at 568.
6. The search incident to arrest exception was first recognized in dictum in Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). There the Court stated:
What then is the present case? Before answering that inquiry specifically, it may
be well by a process of exclusion to state what it is not. It is not an assertion
of the right on the part of the Government, always recognized under English and
American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover
and seize the fruits or evidences of crime.
Id. at 392. The doctrine was again recognized in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
158 (1925), and was stated to extend to a search of the area in the arrestee's control.
Finally, in Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927), the dictum was adopted
as a rule of law to sustain the warrantless search of the defendant's premises. Since that
time the validity of the exception has been well recognized, and the conflict has centered
on the permissible scope of searches incident to arrests. See Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 755-63 (1969).
There are two requisites to the search incident to arrest exception. First, the arrest
must be lawful under the authority of the officer to arrest. United States v. Di Re, 332
U.S. 581 (1948). Second, the arrest must be based on probable cause. Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). Probable
cause exists if the facts and circumstances known by the officer warrant a prudent and
reasonable person to believe an offense has been committed, and the arrestee has
committed it. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959); Le Roux v. State, 207
N.W.2d 589, 596 (Wis. 1973). The Chimel Court assumed that the arrest of the
petitioner was valid. 395 U.S. at 755.
If probable cause for the arrest exists, it is immaterial that the search is conducted
subsequent to or prior to the formal arrest. E.g., United States v. Jenkins, 496 F.2d 57
(2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); United States v. Riggs, 474 F.2d 699
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820 (1973); United States v. Woods, 468 F.2d 1024
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1045 (1972); Bailey v. United States, 389 F.2d 305
(D.C. Cir. 1967); Pendergraft v. Cook, 323 F. Supp. 967 (S.D. Miss.), modified, 446
F.2d 1222 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 886 (1972); People v. Sirak, 2 Cal.
App. 3d 608, 82 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1969). If, however, the arrest is made prior to estab-
lishing probable cause the evidence may not be used, even if probable cause is subse-
quently established. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 362 F. Supp. 415 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Moreover, the offi-
cer is prohibited from delaying the arrest merely so it will occur on premises which the
officer desires to search; such an arrest is considered a pretext to search. United States v.
Martinez, 434 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1970); cf. State v. Baker, 271 A.2d 435 (N.J. Super.
Ct., App. Div. 1970). Compare Eiseman v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. App. 3d 342, 98
Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971).
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pressly overruled7 United States v. Rabinowitz8 and Harris v. United
States,9 which held that incident to an arrest an officer could search the
entire premises where the arrest occurred-the area deemed to be in
the "possession" or under the "control" of the arrestee.10 In sustaining
the petitioner's contention that the search of his entire house"' incident
to -his arrest was unconstitutional, the Court held:
There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's per-
son and the area "within his immediate control"-construing that phrase
to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a wea-
pon or destructible evidence.
12
7. 395 U.S. at 768.
8. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
9. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
10. 395 U.S. at 760.
11. A warrant had been issued for the arrest of the petitioner. Three officers went to
his house and arrested him when he arrived. The officers had no search warrant, but
after being denied permission to look around they proceeded to search the premises. The
search of the petitioner's home lasted some forty-five minutes and extended throughout
the entire three-bedroom house including the attic, garage, and workshop. In some
rooms the petitioner's wife, who accompanied the officers throughout the house, was
directed to open drawers and move the contents about. At the end of the search the
officers seized several items of evidence related to the burglary of a coin shop for which
the petitioner was arrested. Id. at 754.
At the state trial of the petitioner the objects were admitted into evidence over
objection. The petitioner was convicted, and his conviction was affirmed by the
California Supreme Court (People v. Chimel, 68 Cal. 2d 436, 439 P.2d 333, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 421 (1968)) on the ground that despite the lack of a search warrant the arrest
of the petitioner had been valid and the search of the house was justified as incident
thereto.
Compare the search in Chinel with the search upheld by the Court in Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). In Harris the petitioner was arrested in the living
room of his apartment pursuant to an arrest warrant. The officers conducted a search of
the entire apartment to find two cancelled checks involved in the charges of cashing and
transporting interstate forged checks. An envelope marked "personal papers" was found
and opened. Altered Selective Service documents found inside were used as evidence
against Harris in the subsequent trial for violation of the Selective Service Act of 1940.
Id. at 148-49.
Based on the fact that Harris involved the search of a four-room apartment (id. at
148), some courts have reasoned that Chimel was not so much a rejection of the Harris
principles as a matter of judicial line-drawing. See notes 47-62 infra and accompanying
text.
12. 395 U.S. at 763 (emphasis added). Note the earlier statement of the Court in
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), in summarizing the search incident to
arrest exception:
Unquestionably, when a person is lawfully arrested, the police have the right, with-
out a search warrant, to make a contemporaneous search of the person of the ac-
cused for weapons or for the fruits of or implements used to commit the crime.
This right to search and seize without a search warrant extends to things under the
accused's immediate control, and, to an extent depending on the circumstances of
the case, to the place where he is arrested.
Id. at 367 (citations omitted).
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Undeniably, the decision in Chimel placed limitations on the scope of
a permissible search incident to an arrest.13 While some searches are
clearly violative of fourth amendment protections under either the Har-
ris-Rabinowitz or Chimel standards,' 4 in most cases the determination
of the constitutional validity of an area search will depend upon an
interpretation of the operative language of Chimel.'5  This Comment
13. See United States v. De La Cruz Bellinger, 422 F.2d 723 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 942 (1970) (search of a dresser in hallway adjoining the living room where the
arrest took place held valid under the Rabinowitz standards; while Chimel was not
applicable, the court indicated that had it applied the area would not have been within
his immediate control); United States v. Harris, 435 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 986 (1971) (search of a bedroom adjoining room where the arrest took
place held valid since Chimel not to be given retroactive application). Compare United
States v. Holland, 438 F.2d 887 (6th Cir. 1971) (applying pre-Chimel standards, the
search of an entire apartment held valid) with Long v. State, 508 S.W.2d 47 (Ark. 1974)
(search of four rooms of a dwelling without a search warrant held violative of Chimel
standards) and State v. Gumins, 469 P.2d 833 (Ariz. 1970) (defendant arrested in
hallway between the living room and the kitchen, the latter room was searched and
marijuana was found and seized; search held valid since Chimel not retroactive). But
see notes 111-12 infra and accompanying text. One perplexed court has been moved
to comment:
We are inclined to the opinion that with a change in the composition of that court
and the attitude toward crime prevention, that the pendulum will again swing to-
ward the holding enunciated in Harris v. United States . .. and United States v.
Rabinowitz . . . which basically held that a search of the premises was proper as
incident to a lawful arrest in or on the premises. We do not find fault with a rea-
sonable interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
but to limit a search incident to a lawful arrest to items of weapons or destroyable
evidence in the immediate vicinity or reach of the arrested person, must be a real
windfall for criminals.
State v. O'Steen, 238 So. 2d 434, 437 (Fla. Ct. App. 1970).
14. See, e.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970) (without application of Chimel,
held that for a search of a house to be incident to arrest the arrest must occur inside the
house); United States v. Bell, 457 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying pre-Chimel
standards, search of a backyard of a home held invalid when defendant was arrested
at the front door of the house and removed from the scene); United States v. Hooper,
306 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Tenn. 1969) (defendant arrested on back porch of home and
removed from the scene; search of an outbuilding, an automobile parked in the driveway,
and a junked automobile on the premises violated fourth amendment standards); State v.
Roach, 236 So. 2d 782 (La. 1970) (search of entire house invalid under either Chimel or
pre-Chimnel standards); People v. Spinelli, 358 N.Y.S.2d 743 (CL App. 1974) (defendant
arrested in front of building, after searching the arrestee the officers went to the rear of
the lot to look at serial numbers of vehicles believed to be hijacked; search held invalid).
15. One commentator has noted the importance of the lower courts' decisions in this
regard:
Since police practices are affected to a greater extent by the lower courts' interpre-
tation of the new standards than by the standards themselves, an unexplained or
incorrect interpretation of the standards hinders the police in obtaining the informa-
tion necessary to rectify the police practices the Supreme Court thought question-
able.
Note, Search and Seizure Since Chimel v. California, 55 MINN. L. Rnv. 1011, 1019
(1971).
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focuses on the attempts of the lower courts to define the area surround-
ing the arrestee which is deemed to be "within his immediate control" in
the context of searches of premises incident to arrest.10 It will also
16. This Comment limits itself to an examination of the immediate control rule as it
has been applied to searches of dwellings, homes, or other premises incident to arrest.
This focus, however, should not be presumed to indicate that searches of other areas
incident to arrest present no problems. The application of Chimel to searches of
automobiles and other vehicles incident to arrest presents some particularly thorny
problems.
When a search of a vehicle is made without a warrant and in conjunction with an
arrest, both the mobility exception to the warrant requirement and the search incident to
arrest exception to the warrant requirement come into play. But the justification for
these two exceptions must be distinguished. The mobility exception allows a warrantless
search of an automobile or other vehicle when there is probable cause to believe that the
vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime and exigent circumstances are
present. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925). The focus of the two exceptions is, in part, the same: the possible removal
or destruction of evidence. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969); Carroll,
supra at 153. Consequently they are often argued as alternative justifications for the dis-
pensation of a search warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Connolly, 479 F.2d 930 (9th
Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 897 (1973); United States v. Free, 437 F.2d
631 (D.C. Cir. 1970); People 'v. Babie, 287 N.E.2d 24 (Ill. Ct. App. 1972); People v.
Ricketson, 264 N.E.2d 220 (111. Ct. App. 1970); State v. Brewer, 212 N.W.2d 90 (Neb.
1973). It is also possible for both exceptions to apply in a single transaction. A valid
search of an automobile incident to arrest, confined to the proper area, may give rise to
the necessary probable cause to justify a search of the entire automobile under the
Carroll doctrine. See, e.g., State v. Heald, 314 A.2d 820 (Me. 1973).
The similarity and the common grounds of the two exceptions, however, should not be
allowed to blur the fact that each proceeds from a wholly different theory. The Supreme
Court noted in Carroll:
The right to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent on the right
to arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for
belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law.
267 U.S. at 158-59 (emphasis added). Recognition of this distinction is crucial to a
proper analysis of the requisites for the two exceptions and leads to the conclusion that
when a search of a vehicle is incident to arrest neither exigent circumstances nor
probable cause to search must be independently established, but are considered to be
inherent in the arrest situation. E.g., State v. Ponce, 491 P.2d 845 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1971); State v. Hollingshead, 191 N.W.2d 680 (Iowa 1971). On the other hand,
absence of either of those elements in a search alleged to come within the ambit of the
mobility exception would be fatal to the claim. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970); United States v. Payne, 429 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1970) (failure to establish threat
of removal of automobile from jurisdiction); United States v. McIntyre, 304 F. Supp.
1244 (E.D. La. 1969) (no threat that evidence would be removed); Steel v. State, 450
S.W.2d 545 (Ark. 1970) (no proof of mobility). See Comment, Back on the Road
Again-The Mobility Exception in the 70's, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 550 (1974).
The determination of whether or not a warrantless search of an automobile falls
within the mobility exception as opposed to the search incident to arrest exception is of
profound significance in view of the scope limitations of Chimel. The Chimel Court
stated:
Our holding today is of course entirely consistent with the recognized principle
that, assuming the existence of probable cause, automobiles and other vehicles may
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examine the alternative justifications developed by the courts to expand
the permissible scope of such searches. Finally, it will review the
impact of recent Supreme Court decisions on Chimel.
11. DEFINING TIe PERMISSIBLE SCOPE
The Supreme Court has offered little guidance17 to the lower courts
since enunciating the "immediate contror' rule in 1969. Decisions from
be searched without warrants "where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, be-
cause the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought." Carroll v. United States ....
395 U.S. at 764 n.9. This language is clear in one respect: warrantless searches of
automobiles based on the mobility exception need not be confined to the area within the
arrestee's immediate control. United States v. Gibbs, 435 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1972); State v. Garcia, 504 P.2d 172 (Kan. 1972).
Despite this distinction, Chimel has created several problems with regard to the
mobility exception. For example, in Daygee v. State, 514 P.2d 1159 (Alas. 1973), the
court upheld the admission into evidence of items seized from an automobile from which
the passengers had been removed and placed in custody in a police patrol car. The court
rejected the appellant's argument that Chimel must be read to prevent any search of an
automobile once the owner or passengers are in custody since the exigencies justifying
the dispensation of the warrant no longer exist. Id. at 1164-66; accord, United States v.
Ragsdale, 470 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Mehciz, 437 F.2d 145 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971); United States v. Free, 437 F.2d 631 (D. C. Cir.
1970); United States v. Gerlach, 350 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Harris v. State,
486 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1972); see note 50 infra. Contra, Ramon v. Cupp,
423 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1970).
Another question which must be dealt with is whether or not the scope limitations of
Chimel apply to searches of automobiles incident to arrest. In United States v.
Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189 (9th ir. 1971), the defendant was stopped while driving his
car and arrested pursuant to a valid arrest warrant. After the defendant was removed
from his car, frisked, and placed in the police patrol car, the officers returned to the
defendant's automobile and searched it. The court rejected appellants contention that
the search could not be held valid as incident to his arrest, declined to discuss whether
the area searched could be construed as being within the defendant's immediate control,
and distinguished Chimel by holding that it applied only to the search of a home,
apartment, or other dwelling in conjunction with the arrest of the suspect therein. The
court concluded:
The High Court, so far as we are advised, has not to this date engaged in any nice
distinctions regarding the scope of the vehicular search. . .. If the justification
for the search is that it is incident to a lawful arrest, the limitation is that it must
be contemporaneous with the arrest ....
Id. at 1192-93. For other comments related to the immediate control rule and auto-
mobile searches see notes 50, 60 infra.
17. Since its decision in Chimel, the Supreme Court has only considered three cases
dealing specifically with Chimel and the scope restrictions it set forth. In Von Cleef v.
New Jersey, 395 U.S. 814 (1969), and Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818 (1969), both
decided on the same day as Chimel, the Court reversed and remanded since the searches
involved were violative of even the pre-Chimel standards. The Court therefore left open
the question of retroactivity of the decision. This question was resolved in Williams v.
United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971), when the Court declined to accord retroactive effect
to Chimel.
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these courts are therefore unclear and often contradictory. Moreover,
the failure of the courts to make detailed explications of the factual
settings makes it impossible to ascertain whether other circumstances
are truly analogous. A more fundamental flaw in the opinions is that
they usually fail to expound on the particular court's understanding of
the Chimel decision. Unfortunately, the determinative factor in a
court's decision as to whether or not a search incident to arrest falls
within permissible bounds is that court's interpretation of the "immedi-
ate control" rule. The operational definition of the area of immediate
control is inextricably intertwined with this often unarticulated under-
standing of the rationale of Chimel.18 One commentator has succinctly
stated the problem:
By permitting a search to encompass "the area into which an arrestee
might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items," the Court
postulated an ambiguity which has contributed substantially to the in-
consistencies appearing in lower court decisions. The essence of the
problem is this: Is the standard properly understood to define an area
of specified radius with the arrestee at its center, or is this a purposive
definition with each case to be evaluated in terms of the capability of
the arrestee to reach a weapon or evidentiary items?19
Because of this inherent vagueness in the language used by the
Chimel Court, the lower courts have developed two tests by which to
determine the validity of a search of a premises incident to arrest. The
first, which may be termed the physical proximity test, focuses on the
arrestee's hypothetical ability to reach the area searched. It does not
18. The problem is further compounded by the confusion that exists as to which party
has the burden of proving that the search extended beyond the area prescribed by
ChimeL It is established that in cases of warrantless searches the prosecution must show
that a warrant was unnecessary because the search fell within a recognized exception.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969), citing United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S.
48, 51 (1951). However, the Court has not decided the prosecutorial burden in
demonstrating that the search did not exceed the permissible bounds of such a search, or,
conversely, whether the burden is on the defendant to establish that the search did
exceed permissible bounds. The lower courts are split. See, e.g., United States v.
Burrus, 306 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (government's burden to show item was
within the immediate control of the arrestee); People v. Shepherd, 33 Cal. App. 3d 866,
109 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973) (item seized from closet; without other evidence the court will
assume the door was open); State v. Green, 282 So. 2d 461 (La. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 985 (1974) (defendant failed to plead facts in brief that would substantiate his
Chimel claim); State v. Funk, 490 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (defendant did not
establish that the seized items were not within his immediate control); Nicholas 'V. State,
502 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1973) (prosecution failed to show defendant's
proximity to the items seized); cf. Howell v. State, 318 A.2d 189 (Md. Ct. App. 1974)
(state failed to bring a warrantless search of an automobile within Chimel limitations).
19. Cook, Warrantless Searches Incident to Arrest, 24 ALA. L. REv. 607, 621 (1972).
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consider physical limitations placed on the arrestee by the arresting of-
ficer. The second, which may be termed the factual analysis test, fo-
cuses on the actual ability of the arrestee to reach a particular item as
established by the facts of the case.
A. The Physical Proximity Test
The limits of a valid search incident to arrest under the Harris-
Rabinowitz decisions were based upon property law concepts of posses-
sion and control.20 If it can be said that Chimel did not repudiate the
underlying proprietal analysis of these decisions, then it can be argued
that Chimel only represents a judicial limitation on the extent of the area
under the arrestee's control, conceptually measured by the arrestee's
hypothetical ability to reach a particular item. Several courts have
evinced such an understanding of Chimel.
The New York Court of Appeals speculated in People v. Floyd:
21
It suffices that it is not at all clear that the "grabbing distance" authori-
zation in the Chimel case is conditioned upon the arrested person's con-
tinued capacity to "grab."
22
Since the petitioner's arrest in that case was invalid,23 the statement was
dictum. Subsequent New York cases, however, have followed the lead
of the court.
In People v. Gonzalez,24 while the defendant was incarcerated on
other charges, several undercover officers went to his home. After
gaining admittance, one of the officers purchased heroin from the
defendant's girlfriend.25 The officer then arrested her and took her to
a bedroom where he arrested another occupant.26 He then escorted them
both to the front door and admitted two more officers.27 The two
arrestees were handcuffed together and placed in a back bedroom while
the officers searched the apartment and waited for the defendant to re-
turn after being released from custody.2 When the defendant re-
20. Dutile, Some Observations on the Supreme Court's Use of Property Concepts in
Resolving Fourth Amendment Problems, 21 CATH. U.L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1971).
21. 260 N.E.2d 815 (N.Y. 1970).
22. Id. at 817.
23. Id.
24. 331 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 988 (1973).
25. Id. at 337.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 14,
357
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
turned, he was placed under arrest for possession of drugs.2  At his
subsequent trial, drugs which had been found in the bedroom, the
kitchen, and a suitcase in a closet30 were admitted into evidence against
him. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the
conviction in a memorandum decision. A dissenting justice 'argued
that the only justification for this warrantless search was that it was inci-
dent to arrest and once the arrestees were handcuffed and taken to the
front door, the justification ended. 1
The New York Court of Appeals later indicated in People v. Fitzpat-
rick"2 that such results were not contrary to its interpretation of Chimel.
In Fitzpatrick the defendant was arrested while hiding in a closet and
was removed, frisked, and handcuffed. 3 He argued that a subsequent
search of the closet was invalid as the area was no longer within his
"grabbing distance. '3 4  The court cited its language in People v.
Floyd,35 and reasoned that the fact that the defendant was handcuffed
had no bearing on the outcome. 6 More importantly, the court stated
its understanding of the Chimel decision:
Nothing in Chimel requires so narrow a reading of the Fourth Amend-
ment [that the arrestee must have the continuing ability to grab]. The
Court did not disapprove of a search of the "room" or area where the
"arrest occurs"; it condemned only a search "'remote in time or place
from the arrest.'" The immediate search of the very closet where the
defendant was arrested is far different from the proscribed search of
"closed or concealed areas," even in the room where a defendant is ar-
rested. There was here no quality of "rummaging at will" among the
defendant's effects at which the Fourth Amendment is aimed.37
29. Id.
30. Id. at 339 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 338-39 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
32. 300 N.E.2d 139 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
33. Id. at 140.
34. Id. at 143.
35. Id.; see text accompanying note 22 supra.
36. 300 N.E.2d at 143.
37. Id. (emphasis added). Note the analysis of the New York Court of Appeals
regarding the search incident to arrest of the person of the arrestee:
The reason searches of a person and his immediate effects at a place of detention
are permissible is not in the fiction that they are incident to arrest but because of
the maximum intrusion already effected by an arrest and detention pending arraign-
ment ....
Given the nature of the gross intrusion by detention of the person it is reason-
able to conduct a less intrusive search of his person and the possessions he carried
with him.
People v. Perel, 315 N.E.2d 452, 456 (N.Y. 1974) (citations omitted). The dissent in
Chimel had postulated such a theory to justify a search of the entire premises incident to
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While it is true that the Chimel Court did not expressly "disapprove
of a search of the 'room' or area where the 'arrest occurs,'" any c'onclu-
sion that the converse is true can only be made by juxtaposing out of
order several key phrases in the decision. The majority in Chimel, after
setting forth the justification for the search incident to arrest exception
and enunciating the immediate control rule, did state that "[t]here is no
comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any room
other than that in which an arrest occurs . . 3 While this might
support the interpretation of the Fitzpatrick court, the statement was
qualified when the court continued that neither is there any justification
"for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed
areas in that room itself."39 Therefore, it would seem that the fact that
the Chimel Court reiterated its position that "a search . . remote in
time or place from the arrest" is unconstitutional does not detract from
the further limitations it established. In fact, the Chimel Court's state-
ment to that effect was by way of a quotation from Preston v. United
States,4" and was cited as support for the Court's reasoning that a search
without a warrant must be tied to the justifications which initially
authorize it.
41
The dissent in Gonzalez correctly argued that once the occupants of
the apartment had been taken "[into] custody and removed from the
immediate area under their control at arrest, a warrant was required to
search the apartment. 42  That this is the correct interpretation of
Chimel is supported by the fact that, prior to announcing the immediate
control rule, the Chimel court cited Terry v. Ohio4 3 and its statement
arrest provided that there is probable cause to search the premises. 395 U.S. at 776.
The majority responded to the contention:
[WMe can see no reason why, simply because some interference with an individual's
privacy and freedom of movement has lawfully taken place, further intrusions
should automatically be allowed despite the absence of a warrant that the Fourth
Amendment would otherwise require.
Id. at 766 n.12.
38. 395 U.S. at 763 (emphasis added).
39. Id.
40. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
41. 395 U.S. at 764. Of course, the Fitzpatrick decision can find some tangential
support in ChimeL The rummaging at will concept included in the Fitzpatrick opinion
(see text at note 37 supra) came from a statement by Judge Learned Hand in United
States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (1926), which was quoted by the majority in
Chimel in its conclusion. 395 U.S. at 767-68. It appears that the citation was made as
a philosophical statement of the protection accorded an individual by the warrant
requirement, and not as a statement of the controlling rule of law. It is also significant
that this quotation was set forth immediately prior to the Court's express overruling of
Rabinowitz and Harris.
42. 331 N.Y.S.2d at 337, 338 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
43. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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therein that "'t]he scope of [a] search must be "strictly tied to and
justified by" the circumstances which rendered its initiation permis-
sible.' " Since Chimel set forth the initial justifications for the search
incident to arrest exception as the need to protect the officer and to
prevent destruction of evidence,45 the search must end once these
dangers are mitigated either by the removal of the defendant from the
area -or by other means. Thus, the immediate control limitation
only makes sense if it is supported by a rationale resting on danger to
the police or evidence destruction. If a search could be conducted after
the apprehended person can no longer reach any evidence or weapon,
the definition of the allowable search area as, in effect, the "grabbing
area" becomes completely arbitrary and without any underlying justifi-
cation. 4
6
The New York court, however, is not alone in positing that Chime l
authorizes a search of the entire room where the arrest occurs, regard-
less of the restraints placed upon the arrestee. The supreme courts of
Mississippi and Minnesota have apparently adopted approaches similar
to that of New York. In Brewer v. State,47 the defendant was arrested
at the door to his motel room; nevertheless, the police entered and
searched the room. 48 The Mississippi Supreme Court, relying on the
fact that the evidence seized was "found in [the defendant's] motel
room, which was under his control," upheld the search.40  The court
distinguished Chimel in that it was a search of a three bedroom home
while the instant situation encompassed a search confined to a "single
motel room rented and actually occupied by the [arrestee]." 50  Con-
sequently the court concluded it was reasonable under all the facts.
44. 395 U.S. at 762, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
45. Id. at 763.
46. People v. Fitzpatrick, 300 N.E.2d 139, 147 (N.Y. 1973) (Wachtler, J., concur-
ring).
47. 228 So. 2d 582 (Miss. 1969).
48. Id. at 584.
49. Id.
50. Id. The search in Brewer occurred prior to the decision in Chimel, and the
court's distinction need not have been made. However, the impact of the statement of
the court cannot be underestimated. In addition to distinguishing Chimel, the court
cited a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals pre-Chimeil case (Albright v. United States, 402
F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1968)) for support of its position that the search and seizure was
lawful. Thus, the court did not appear to perceive any shift in the basis underlying
Chimel from Harris-Rabinowitz and still interpreted Chimel in light of property law
concepts of control.
The Mississippi court has been more articulate in dealing with the search of an
automobile incident to arrest. In Hall v. State, 288 So. 2d 850 (Miss. 1974), the
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In a later case, the Mississippi court expanded the permissible scope
of a search incident to arrest to include not only the room where the
arrest occurred but also the rooms where the officers knew an instru-
mentality of the crime for which the person was being arrested was
secreted. The defendant in Murphy v. State5 was charged with pos-
session of whiskey for resale without a license. Evidence introduced
at trial was seized from the defendant's premises in conjunction with
the arrest of another person on the premises. The arrest was executed
in one room and the officer immediately proceeded to another room
and seized the whiskey from an open closet.52 The court again dis-
tinguished Chimel as encompassing a search of many rooms whereas
the search involved in this case was "limited to the very room that [the
arrestee] was actually seen to enter empty-handed [and return] with a
bottle of whiskey in his hand which he sold to [the arresting officer].1
53
Similarly, in State v. Cox,54 the Minnesota Supreme Court acknowl-
edged the validity of a search of the entire room where the arrest took
place as a search incident to arrest. There the defendant was arrested
in his bedroom by seven officers who seated him on a chair in the
room.55  While the specific item alleged by the defendant to have been
illegally seized was under the cushion of a settee within five to eight
defendant was arrested as he ran from a house. The court upheld the warrantless search
of the defendant's automobile as incident to his arrest. The court reasoned that the
defendant might try to get at it or someone else in the house might try to help him.
Consequently, the officers were entitled to take any measures necessary to prevent the
defendant from gaining access to the automobile or any weapons therein. However, it is
arguable whether the search of an automobile is necessary to prevent the arrestee's access
to it. In fact the officer would not be able to search the automobile if the arrestee were
trying to get into it; in all likelihood the arrestee would have to be restrained prior to the
search and thus there would be no justification for a warrantless search incident to
arrest. The Mississippi court in this situation, however, has stated:
The courts can best serve the administration of justice by recognizing that although
the court must determine whether a search is reasonable, the officer's action must
be reviewed in light of the practical, everyday affairs of life.
Judges are far removed from the night vigil, the danger, the physical surround-
ings, local conditions and characteristics as well as the unpredictable behavior of
the criminal element in society. The local officer lives with these factors, and we
ought to take this into account in passing upon reasonableness of official conduct.
Id. at 852. In view of the lack of factual background set forth in the case, the court
seems to be calling for an abdication of the judicial determination of reasonableness and
accepting in lieu thereof the determination of the officer. Such a position might underlie
the court's decision in cases dealing with the searches of premises incident to arrest,
albeit such a rationale has not been articulated in such cases.
51. 239 So. 2d 162 (Miss. 1970).
52. Id. at 163.
53. Id. at 164.
54. 200 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1972).
55. Id. at 308.
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feet of the defendant,56 the court held that the search was valid to the
extent the officers stayed in the bedroom-the area deemed to be in
the control of the defendant.5 7  That the court was relying not on the
actual ability of the defendant to reach the area searched is clear. The
court stated:
The fact that defendant may have been handcuffed at the time the po-
lice searched that limited area is not alone a sufficient factor to distin-
guish this case from other cases in which we have approved the search
involved as being limited to the area within the arrestee's immediate
control.58
It should be noted that the two cases 9 which the Minnesota court
found indistinguishable were both decided on pre-Chimel standards-
a factor which it apparently did not consider. Furthermore, the court
failed to take cognizance of the fact that six officers completely sur-
rounded the arrestee. This superficial analysis suggests that the court
was opting for the easy expedient of a mechanical rule allowing a
search of the entire room where the arrest occurs. 60
These courts' approaches suffer from the same infirmity as does the
New York courts' analysis: they find no support in the language of
Chimel. More significantly, they fail to recognize the Chimel Court's
implicit rejection of such an approach. In fact, the Supreme Court
56. Id. at 309.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. The cases cited were: State v. Fulford, 187 N.W.2d 270 (Minn. 1971) (upholding
the seizure of a knife from the defendant's coat which was on a chair a few feet away
from the defendant), and Simberg v. State, 179 N.W.2d 141 (Minn. 1970) (upholding a
search of the defendant's trousers draped over a chair a few feet from him). It should
be noted that in both these cases the items were found in clothing belonging to the
defendant which in all likelihood would accompany the defendant and would thus
eventually have to be put in the control of the arrestee. See notes 130-48 infra and
accompanying text. The item in Cox, however, was hidden in a stationary non-apparel
item.
60. The Arizona courts seem to be in accord with the Minnesota courts in some
respects. In State v. Hays, 496 P.2d 628 (Ariz. 1972), the defendant was sitting in the
living room and a search was made of a nearby bookcase. The court stated:
[We do not] believe a different result is mandated because there was an officer
stationed between the bookcase and defendant. The guidelines set forth in Chimel
are meant to limit the area of a search and are not dependent upon the location
of an officer in respect to the person being searched.
Id. at 630. Cf. State v. Gerry, 489 P.2d 288 (Ariz. 1971) (defendant arrested outside of
car, drugs found in glove compartment held to be admissible since whole car was in
defendant's immediate control); State v. Kelly, 480 P.2d 658 (Ariz.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 866 (1971) (defendant arrested while driving car, removed and placed in back seat
of patrol car; subsequent search of defendant's car held to be incident to arrest).
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discussed the possibility of drawing a line between the searches held
valid in Rabinowitz and Harris and the search under consideration in
Chimel, noting:
[S]uch a distinction would be highly artificial. The rationale that al-
lowed the searches and seizures in Rabinowitz and Harris would allow
the searches and seizures in this case. No consideration relevant to the
Fourth Amendment suggests any point of rational limitation, once the
search is allowed to go beyond the area from which the person arrested
might obtain weapons or evidentiary items. 61
The Court further cited Justice Jackson's dissent in Harris where he
stated "'that once the search is allowed to go beyond the person ar-
rested and the bbjects upon him or in his immediate physical control,
I see no practical limit [other than] no limit at all.' "62 Clearly the
Court rejected any judicial line-drawing that would allow searches be-
yond the area of the arrestee, as measured by either the real or hypo-
thetical -ability of the arrestee to gain access to an item of evidence or
a weapon. Since those courts which allow a search to extend through-
out the room where the arrest occurs do so without regard to whether
the room is in the arrestee's control, they are in conflict with Chimel.
Other courts have avoided the necessity of conducting a detailed
examination of the factual surroundings by adopting a standard that
allows a search to extend to all areas and certain items categorically
deemed to be under the control of the arrestee at the moment of the
arrest, irrespective of the arrestee's actual 'abilities. In dicta in several
cases the California courts have approved of such an approach. For
example, in People v. Belvin 3 the defendant was arrested at her home
and was permitted to go into a bedroom where two other persons were
present; as she sat on the bed, her purse was on the floor beside her.
64
The defendant and the others present were then taken to the living
room. The officers returned to the bedroom and searched the purse.6 5
Though the search was subject only to pre-Chimel standards, the court
nevertheless discussed the case in light of Chimel. In upholding the
search, the California Court of Appeal stated:
It is apparent from Chimel that a search of an arrested person is lim-
ited to the person of the arrestee and the area under that persons im-
61. 395 U.S. at 766 (footnote omitted).
62. Id. at 766 n.11, quoting United States v. Harris, 331 U.S. 145, 197 (1947)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
63. 275 Cal. App. 2d 955, 80 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1969).
64. Id. at 957, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
65. Id.
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mediate control .... But it is equally evident that normal extensions
of the person remain subject to search and that articles customarily car-
ried by an arrested person fall within the area of his immediate control.
In the category of such articles we include a woman's purse, a man's wal-
let, a jacket, a hat, an overcoat, and a brief case in use at the time of
the arrest, even though these articles may not be on the immediate per-
son of the arrestee at the moment of arrest. . . . We conclude that the
defendant's purse, apparently in use by her at the time of her arrest, le-
gally amounted to an extension of her person and could be searched on
her arrest. Whether the search of the purse took place before or after
defendant's physical removal to another room we consider wholly fortui-
tous. 3
6
Subsequently, in People v. Arvizu,6 7 the California Court of Appeal
cited Belvin as indistinguishable in sustaining the search of a duffel bag
at the foot of a bed upon which the defendant was lying when arrested.
While Chimel was not controlling due to its prospective application, 8
the court indicated the arrest and search would be proper under
Chimel.69 It did so without any discussion of the particular facts of the
case in light of the Chimel rationale. In a similar case, People v.
King,70 the California Supreme Court indicated in dictum that a search
of the area under the bed where the arrestee was lying when arrested
was proper. The case did not indicate the number of officers present,
whether the arrestee was handcuffed or restrained in any manner, and
the actual accessibility of the defendant to the area searched. 71 As
dissenting Justice Peters noted:
The record reveals nothing about the size of the bed or the location of
the paper bag beneath it. Unless the bag was within the defendant's
reach, the requirements of Chimel are not satisfied. I do not believe
that this court should rush in and declare that items under beds, without
more, are lawful objects of a search under Chimel.
72
The dicta set forth in these cases has been adopted in the California
courts, which seem to be moving towards an application of a rule that
items within a predefined radius at the time of the arrest, notwithstand-
ing the ability or inability of the arrestee to reach them, are within the
66. Id. at 958-59, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 384 (emphasis added).
67. 12 Cal. App. 3d 726, 90 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1970).
68. Id. at 729, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
69. Id.
70. 5 Cal. 3d 458, 487 P.2d 1032, 96 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1971).
71. Id. at 463, 487 P.2d at 1035, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
72. Id. at 468, 487 P.2d at 1038, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 470 (Peters, J., dissenting).
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confines set forth in Chimel.7" Some California courts have gone so far
as to find that the mere fact that a searched item is one of those set forth
in Belvin74 as customarily carried by the arrestee is sufficient, in and
of itself, to justify the conclusion that the item was under the control
of the defendant at the time of the arrest.75 Still other California courts
have extended the rationale of Belvin to movable items not specifically
enumerated therein. For example, in People v. Spencer
8 the California
Court of Appeal relied on King and Arvizu to uphold the search of
a box at the foot of a bed on which the arrestee was lying when appre-
hended. The court upheld the search as the "obviously reasonable
course," even though it noted that contemporaneously with the search
one officer had "subdued and handcuffed the resisting suspect.
' 77  The
only factor mentioned by the court that would indicate that the de-
fendant could have obtained access to the box was the fact that the
arrest occurred in "the close confines of an auto trailer.
'78
73. But cf. Bethune v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. App. 3d 249, 89 Cal. Rptr. 690 (1970).
The Florida courts would seem to come closest to a rule that categorically places some
areas within the scope of ChimeL See Johnson v. State, 252 So. 2d 371 (Fla. Ct. App.
1971) (seizure of item five to six feet from defendant upheld as within the bounds of
Chimel); Holmes v. State, 228 So. 2d 417 (Fla. CL App. 1969) (seizure of an item eight
feet from the defendant upheld as within the bounds of Chimel). It should be noted
that both of these cases rely on no more than a statement as to the number of feet
between the defendant and the item seized. Cf. Perkins v. State, 228 So. 2d 382 (Fla.
1969) (search of room where defendant was arrested permissible under Chimel) (dic-
turn). The failure of the Florida courts to set forth their reasoning in the particular
cases may be due to their expressed hostility to Chimel. See note 13 supra.
74. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
75. In People v. Edwards, 22 Cal. App. 3d 598, 99 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1971), the
defendant was seen rummaging through purses in a hospital. When the defendant
returned the next day, authorities summoned an eyewitness who verified the identity of
the defendant and, as a result, the defendant was arrested in the public lobby of the
hospital. There was a jacket on a chair next to the defendant and a hospital officer told
the police that the defendant had been wearing it. The police searched the jacket and
found a packet of heroin in a pocket. The court upheld the warrantless search and
seizure of the jacket as incident to the arrest of the defendant since the jacket was to be
considered part of the clothing worn by the defendant. Id. at 602, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
76. 22 Cal. App. 3d 786, 99 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1972).
77. Id. at 797, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
78. Id. at 798, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 688. In People v. Superior Court (Manfredo), 17 Cal.
App. 3d 195, 94 Cal. Rptr. 643 (1971), the court of appeal sustained the search of a
shopping bag found within a room where the arrest occurred. The facts do not establish
the relationship of the defendant to the shopping bag, or the spatial distance between the
defendant and the area searched. According to the testimony of the prosecution witness,
several officers executed the arrest, it occurred at the entrance to the room, and the
defendant was under the influence of drugs and acting as if in a stupor. Id. at 199, 94
Cal. Rptr. at 645. In view of such testimony, it is highly unlikely that the court was
relying on the actual ability of the arre.tee to gain control of the bag.
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As the foregoing discussion has demonstrated, it is difficult to recon-
cile the decisions of the courts utilizing the physical proximity test with
the underpinnings of the Chimel decision. Most courts which follow
the physical proximity test, or some variant thereof, rely upon the
characterization of the police conduct as the reasonable course under the
circumstances."9 However, while the talisman of reasonableness may
provide the semblance of a legal basis for these approaches, the Court in
Chimel expressly rejected the criteria of reasonableness as the means to
limit the scope of searches of premises incident to arrest. Such an
abstract standard, the Court noted,
is founded on little more than a subjective view regarding the accept-
ability of certain sorts of police conduct, and not on considerations
relevant to Fourth Amendment interests. Under such an unconfined
analysis, Fourth Amendment protection in the area would approach
the evaporation point.8
The majority's rejection of a reasonableness standard is underscored
by the dissenting opinion of Justice White, joined by Justice Black."'
After noting that the fourth amendment does not prohibit warrantless,
but only unreasonable searches, Justice White chastised the majority for
not adhering to that standard. He posited that while the justifications
which make reasonable the search of the arrestee and the area within his
or her immediate control "do not apply to the search of areas to which
the accused does not have ready physical access [, t]his is not, however,
enough to prove such searches unconstitutional. ' 2 Justice White then
argued that, if there is probable cause to search, a warrantless search of
the premises upon which an arrest occurs is reasonable because
it is unreasonable to require the police to leave the scene in order to ob-
tain a search warrant when -they are already legaliy there to make a valid
arrest, and when there must almost always be a strong possibility that
confederates of the arrested man will in the meanwhile remove the items
for which the police have probable cause to search.
83
79. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 37, 77 supra.
80. 395 U.S. at 764-65.
81. Id. at 770.
82. Id. at 773 (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 774. The fact that there is a "strong possibility" that others may destroy
evidence at the scene of the arrest and that, in effect, the arrest inherently creates
exigent circumstances is not a valid reason to abrogate the rule announced by the
majority in Chimel. First, it is arguable whether such circumstances exist in all cases of
searches of premises incident to arrest. And it is questionable whether the protection
accorded by the fourth amendment should be dissipated upon the basis of "strong
probabilities." Second, if the circumstances set forth by the dissent actually exist in a
given situation, it is possible to resolve the conflict between the fourth amendment
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Thus it was the dissent and not the majority which argued that the
reasonableness of the police conduct should determine the scope of a
search incident to arrest. The incantation of the legal axiom of reason-
ableness cannot support the argument that the physical proximity test
is the correct interpretation of the immediate control rule.
B. The Factual Analysis Test
In addition to rejecting a reasonableness standard, a substantial por-
tion of the majority opinion is directed to examining the justifications
for the search incident to arrest exception. 4 The Court suggested that
a similarity exists between the "stop and frisk" and the search incident
to arrest situations and concluded:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the lat-
ter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Oth-
erwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest it-
self frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting
officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in
order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into
which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary
items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or
in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the
arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person ar-
rested.85
The Court's opinion is not free from ambiguity, but this passage indi-
cates that the Court was abandoning fictionalized concepts of control,86
requiring instead that the search extend only to those areas over which
the arrestee may have actual control. Otherwise, how is the search to be
limited to and justified by the initial circumstances authorizing it? If
this is the rationale behind Chimel, then courts would have to engage in
a detailed factual examination of the setting where the arrest took place
protection and the desire to aid police enforcement without doing away with the
immediate control rule. If there are confederates of an arrestee who realistically pose a
threat to the preservation of evidence, law enforcement officers may argue that the facts
give rise to a situation wherein the "exigent circumstances" exception to the search
warrant should apply. See note 2 supra. Another approach would be to recognize such
situations as an exception to the general limitations of Chimel, and a legitimate
justification for the extension of the search to areas not directly under the immediate
control of the defendant. Several courts have recognized such an exception to Chimel
on several different theories. See notes 121-29, 150-75 infra and accompanying text.
84. See 395 U.S. at 762-64.
85. Id. at 762-63.
86. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
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-- examining the number of officers present, the position of the officers
in relation to the arrestee, the physical restraints placed on the arrestee,
and the capabilities of the arrestee.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted such a factual analysis
test in United States v. Shye. 7 In that case six or seven officers arrested
four defendants in an apartment for armed robbery. The arrestees were
lined up against a wall in the apartment "spread-eagle" by one officer,
and other officers then seized a sack of money discovered behind a
water heater by an adjoining wall about four feet from the nearest
suspect.88 Between the suspect and the water heater was a hallway, and
the water heater was set in a closet-like recess. 89 Emphasizing that the
search incident to arrest exception can be invoked only when there is
danger to the officers or the possibility of destruction of evidence and
agreeing with the district court that "'the officers had the situation
completely under control,' " the court rejected the prosecution's argu-
ment that the item was lawfully seized incident to arrest. The court
noted that an officer had been stationed between the water heater and
the nearest suspect and therefore the item could not be under the
suspect's immediate control as defined in Chimel.'
Subsequently, this same circuit court conducted an examination of a
similar situation but, because of factual variations, reached a contrary
conclusion. In United States v. Becker92 the defendant was arrested but
had not been handcuffed or bound, and an officer opened a desk drawer
three to five feet from the defendant. 93 The officer stated that his
purpose in doing so was to search for weapons and to secure the desk
from the defendant's control.9 4 Relying on the officer's testimony and
the fact that the defendant was resisting arrest and attempting to move
in directions other than those prescribed by the officer, the court held
the search to be within the permissible scope of a search incident to
arrest.9 5 The court also distinguished Shye since there was no officer
87. 473 F.2d 1061 (6th Cir. 1973).
88. Id. at 1063.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1066.
91. Id.
92. 485 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 992 (1974).
93. Id. at 53.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 55. It should be noted that a test which calls for an analysis of the facts
surrounding the search can lead to diverse conclusions based on the same facts. Compare
United States v. Becker, 485 F.2d 51, 51-55 (6th Cir. 1973) (majority opinion) with id.
at 58-59 (McCree, J., dissenting). Judge McCree relied heavily on portions of the
officer's testimony that indicated the defendant was under control at the time of tho
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between the arrestee and the desk drawer until the officer moved to look
for weapons. 96 The Sixth Circuit thus made it clear that the application
of Chimel in its estimation requires an examination of at least the
position of any officers in relation to the defendant and the area
searched, and the existence of any effective restraints placed upon the
arrestee.
97
Other circuit courts of appeals appear to be in substantial accord with
the Sixth Circuit: both the Second and the Tenth Circuits have adopted
an approach centering on the actual ability of the defendant to control
the particular area searched. 98 In United States v. Mapp,99 a Second
arrest and that there was no apprehension of danger on the officer's part when he
searched the desk. The dissent also noted that at the time of the search the officers
present had put their weapons away. According to the officer's testimony, quoted by the
dissent, the search occurred after the defendant was subdued, i.e., "'he was no longer in
a violent nature or position to pull a gun or anything."' Id. at 59. Judge McCree was
the author of the majority opinion in United States v. Shye, 473 F.2d 1061 (6th Cir.
1973). See notes 87-91 supra and accompanying text.
96. 485 F.2d at 55.
97. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has not been uniform in its application of a
requirement that an examination be made of the factual circumstances surrounding a
search, apparently applying a different test when the search involves a suitcase or
briefcase. See United States v. Kaye, 492 F.2d 744 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Burch, 471 F.2d 1314 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Robbins, 424 F.2d 57 (6th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 985 (1971). See note 186 infra.
98. In addition to the Second and Tenth Circuits, the Fifth Circuit is apparently in
accord with the Sixth Circuit. In United States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 841 (1973), the court refused to uphold the warrantless search of a
suitcase located one and one-half feet from the head of the bed where the arrestee was
when arrested. The court noted that the defendant was handcuffed either in front of
himself or behind his back. Furthermore, the record did not establish the arrestee's
presence in relation to the suitcase. The court stated:
Both of these facts are relevant to a determination of access to weapons or destruc-
tible evidence which is the crucial factor in the Chimel analysis.
For example, if defendant's hands were cuffed in front and he were in close prox-
imity to the suitcase, then the search here could probably be justified under Chime.
Even with the presence of numerous FBI agents in the room, we cannot say that
it would be unreasonable to believe that Jones might attempt to lay his hands on
a weapon located inside the suitcase. But if defendant's hands were cuffed behind
him in such a manner that he was denied access to the suitcase, then the search
could not be upheld under Chimel because the suitcase would not be within his im-
mediate control or within an area from which he might gain possession of a weapon
or destructible evidence.
It might seem anomalous for the validitv of a search to depend on the position
of a defendant's hands. Nonetheless, the Chimel analysis requires just this sort of
an examination of the facts. In essence, the approach to a claim that a search was
incident to an arrest is for the court to examine the facts and make an objective
determination of a rather subjective question: could the law enforcement officials
on the scene reasonably expect the arrested person to gain hold of a weapon or
evidence in the area searched?
Id. at 727-28 (footnote omitted). The search, however, was upheld on other grounds.
Id. at 725. The case represents a significant shift from the court's earlier approach to
Chimel problems. See United States v. Harrison, 461 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
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Circuit case, six agents broke into an apartment after announcing their
authority.' After arresting one individual on the premises, they asked
another occupant to disclose the location of a package of heroin that
they believed the defendant had delivered to the premises.' 0' The
individual indicated that the heroin was located in a closet.10 2  The
409 U.S. 884 (1972); United States v. Wysocki, 457 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 859 (1972). And the approach has not been subsequently applied since the
searches in later cases have involved automobile searches incident to arrest. See Strader
v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 969 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 994 (1974); United States v.
Frick, 490 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974).
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals is unclear as to the approach it has adopted in
applying the Chimel immediate control rule. In United States v. Ciotti, 469 F.2d 1204
(3d Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 1151 (1974), the court upheld the
search of a briefcase even though the defendant was handcuffed. The court reasoned
that the handcuffs would not prevent the arrestee from opening the briefcase or using a
gun if one were available. Id. at 1207. The court also noted that prior to making the
arrest the officers heard what they believed to be the cocking of a gun and therefore they
could have believed that a gun was present. Id. While the court may thus appear to be
applying a factual analysis approach to the immediate control rule, the superficiality of
the examination may indicate a contrary position. On the other hand, in view of the
court's citation of United States v. Robbins, 424 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 985 (1971), it may have been simply recognizing an exception to the general
application of a factual analysis rule. See note 97 supra; note 186 infra. But see United
States v. Schartner, 426 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1970) (upholding under pre-Chimel standards
a search of a suitcase found in a one-room cabin where the arrest took place, but ac-
knowledging that Chimel might prohibit searches into closed areas of the room).
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals arguably has rejected an approach requiring an
analysis of the facts surrounding a search. See United States v. Ponce, 449 F.2d 1299
(9th. Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (upheld search as being within Chimel scope since item
seized was in a "nearby" dresser drawer). Other circuits have not expressed their
position on the question, nor can one be gleaned from the cases. The Eighth Circuit,
however, has held that the range of permissible search under Chimel is not limited to the
arm's length, but the leaping distance of the arrestee. In re Kiser, 419 F.2d 1134, 1137
(8th Cir. 1969).
99. 476 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1973).
100. Id. at 75. The facts of Mapp underscore some of the various problems that may
be confronted when a search is alleged to come within the search incident to arrest
exception to the warrant requirement. As noted earlier, for a search incident to arrest to
be valid the underlying arrest must be legal and proper under all governing rules. See
note 6 supra. In Mapp the defendant attacked the underlying arrest on several grounds.
As summarized by the court, the defendant asserted that
the Task Force agents did not have probable cause to arrest the occupants of [the
apartment where the search occurred]; that even if there was probable cause to ar-
rest, the agents were required to secure a warrant before effecting a nighttime ar-
rest in a dwelling; that even if the warrantless entry was otherwise legal, it became
unlawful as a result of the failure of the officers to announce both their identity
and purpose prior to entry ....
476 F.2d at 71. The court disposed of all the claims against the defendant. Id.
101. 476 F.2d at 70.
102. Id.
1976] PREMISES SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARRESTS 371
court rejected the government's claim of consent to search and disposed
of the claim that the seizure was incident to arrest by noting that there
were six armed officers present in a one-bedroom apartment10 3 and that
one of the officers was between the closet and the co-occupant. 04 The
court reasoned:
Unless [the defendant's accomplice] were either an acrobat or a Hou-
dini. . . we cannot conceive how the closet could have fallen within the
area of her immediate control. To say that the closet was an area into
which she was able to reach, despite the fact that an armed officer stood
between her and it, would, in effect, be to hold that a search of all the
enclosed places in .[the] bedroom would have been consistent with the
Fourth Amendment-a result explicitly foreclosed by Chimel.'0 5
The court apparently left open the possibility, however, that in a partic-
ular factual setting suoh a search could be reasonable and within the
bounds of Chimel when it stated:
[Tihe officers here involved [did not] point to any articulable reasons
leading them to believe that [the defendant's accomplice] was an espe-
cially dangerous person against whom extraordinary protective measures
may have been required . . ..1
While the Second Circuit considers the position of the officers in
relation to both the arrestee and the place searched to be critical to the
outcome of its analysis, the Tenth Circuit focuses on the effectiveness of
the restraints placed upon the arrestee. In United States v. Patterson"'r
five officers went to the defendant's house to arrest the defendant's
spouse; she was arrested in the living room. The defendant was also
arrested and was frisked to determine if he had any weapons upon his
person; none were found.'0 8 One officer went into the kitchen and saw
a partially hidden envelope on a shelf in a cabinet and seized it.' °9 The
court upheld the seizure of the envelope since the defendant's spouse at
the time of the seizure had voluntarily moved to within four to six feet of
the cabinet and it was accessible to her merely by turning around."'
103. Id. at 76-79.
104. Id. at 80.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 447 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1972).
108. Id. at 425.
109. Id. The court also noted that the officer who seized the items testified that he
was searching for a pistol since one was taken in a burglary of an apartment for which
the defendant's spouse was suspected. Id. at 426.
110. Id. at 426-27. The defendant argued that the search was invalid because his wife
was neither in nor facing the kitchen, the room in which the evidence seized was found.
The court found that these facts did not negate the ease of access to the area which the
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The court distinguished an earlier case"' where it had held a similar
search invalid because the defendant had been handcuffed. The re-
straints in the present case, including the presence of an officer be-
tween the defendant and the cabinet searched, the court reasoned,
were not as effective. 112  The conclusion of the Patterson court may
be debatable, and, in fact, it gives rise to the question of whether the
factual analysis test provides an arrestee with 'any greater fourth amend-
ment protection than does the physical proximity test. It would appear
quite easy for any court to hypothesize that a particular fact, or facts,
could be interpreted as presenting one of the dangers against which
the search incident to arrest is directed. Nonetheless, to argue that
the factual analysis test should be abandoned because of possible mis-
application is unjustifiable, especially in light of the principles underly-
ing the Chimel decision.
Several state courts have also adopted a factual analysis interpretation
of the immediate control rule. Based upon a review of the federal court
arrestee enjoyed, stating that "[s]urely [the defendant] would not argue before this court
that a weapon concealed on a table or in a drawer just beyond a doorway is any less
dangerous than a weapon in the room being occupied." Id. at 426 (footnote omitted).
The court cited as support for this proposition the Eighth Circuit case of In re Kiser, 419
F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1969), which held that the immediate control extended to the
"leaping range" of the arrestee. Of course it is questionable whether the arrestee in
Patterson even could have leaped close enough to the cabinet to have gained access to the
evidence, as an officer was stationed between her and the cabinet. Id. at 427. The
court found this not to be an effective restraint. Id.; see note 111 infra.
111. United States v. Baca, 417 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 979
(1971). Baca was decided on the basis of pre-Chimel standards, and it is therefore
interesting that as compared to Patterson, which was decided under Chimel, it reached a
decision that is more restrictive vis-,-vis permissible police conduct. Cf. note 13 supra.
However, the Baca court cited the controlling test as that set forth in Preston (see note
12 supra) and thus it was applying a standard almost identical to ChimeL.
112. 447 F.2d at 427. The distinction made by the court is not extremely persuasive.
In Baca the defendant was arrested in the doorway of a bedroom of his apartment. At
the time of the arrest the officers saw in plain view some narcotics paraphernalia and
two vials which contained what appeared to be narcotic substances. 417 F.2d at 104.
While Baca was handcuffed, the officers then proceeded to search the apartment,
apparently searching areas within the bedroom and elsewhere. As to the search of areas
within the bedroom, the court stated:
[lit can hardly be said or found that the closet ...was under Baca's immediate
control when he was physically confined to a limited area within the 9 X 12 bed-
room . . . . Moreover, it cannot be said that the inside of his bureau drawers,
night stand, under the bed or any similar area was under any type of control by
Baca inasmuch as he was handcuffed with his hands behind his back ....
Id. at 105. Thus it would appear that the court was relying on the fact that the
defendant was handcuffed only as to the search of areas within the room where the
defendant was confined, and, as to areas outside the room, the critical fact was that the
defendant was confined to one room.
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decisions, the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled that the determination of
the permissible scope of a search under Chimel requires the court to
look to the actual capability of the arrestee to gain control of the specific
area searched. In People v. Williams,"3 the court stated:
[Tihere can be no hard and fast rule defining the permissible scope
of a warrantless search incident to an arrest. Certainly an arbitrary
limitation to a certain number of feet would be unsatisfactory. Whether
the search is reasonable must depend on the particular facts of the
case."14
Applying that standard to the case before it, the court found the search
of a bag seven to ten feet from the defendant resulting in the seizure of a
gun to be reasonable." 5  The court relied upon the facts that the
arrestee was known to be armed, that there was present another person
who might attempt to assist the defendant, and that the defendant would
have to be taken past the shelf as he was escorted from the room.
Therefore, the court reasoned, he would have easy access to the
shelf." 81 A decision such as this is perhaps the most desirable. It is
both consistent with Chimel and articulates the particular facts that law
enforcement officers and courts must look to in determining the limits of
the immediate control rule. 1 7
113. 311 N.E.2d 681 (Ill.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974).
114. Id. at 685.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 684, 685.
117. Such a decision also goes far in responding to objections made by some that a
factual analysis approach, or the immediate control rule in the abstract, is so vague as to
be unmanageable. See note 5 supra. It clearly gives the lower courts and police
officials more guidance as to the bounds of a permissible search than do the opinions
which, without setting forth the underlying interpretation of Chimel or the specific facts
of the case, simply state that an item is or is not within the permissible bounds of a
search incident to arrest. See, e.g., cases cited at note 73 supra.
In fact, the decision in Williams has cleared up some confusion that previously plagued
the Illinois courts. The Supreme Court of Illinois had indicated in People v. Perry, 266
N.E.2d 330 (I. 1971), that a warrantless search of an arrestee's hotel room while the
arrestee was handcuffed and removed from the room was permissible even under Chimel
standards. The court stated that the search was permissible since the officers had seen
the defendant take something out of or put something into a partially open dresser
drawer. Id. at 333. The decision appeared to ignore the actual ability of the defendant
to have access to the area searched and the motive of the officers in searching. Thus, it
was in conflict with the court's earlier holding in People v. Machroli, 254 N.E.2d 450
(IMl. 1969). The defendant in that case was arrested at home clad only in shorts and a
tee shirt. Another person who also resided in the defendant's apartment gave the officer
some clothes belonging to the defendant which he in turn gave to the defendant. Id. at
451. The officer checked the pockets of the defendant's jacket, but not his trousers.
After donning the trousers, the defendant removed a box from one of the pockets and
placed it on a dresser. Id. After the defendant left the room, the officer seized the box
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Other courts have adopted a more stringent factual analysis standard
which requires that the officer articulate some sense of danger, as
evidenced by the officer's actions in the situation, or that the crime be
one for which there is tangible evidence. 118 The reasoning of these
courts is that without such circumstances the initial justification for the
search is non-existent. Other courts require only that the possibility
exist that the arrestee be able to reach the area, and do not consider the
beliefs of the officer or the existence of evidence of the specific crime
as determinative. 1 9
While it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the
physical proximity or factual analysis test is the more accepted interpre-
tation of the immediate control rule,' 20 there is no question that the
latter better comports with the rationale of Chimel. Furthermore, those
who argue that the physical proximity test should be followed because of
and found some pills inside. The pills were later found to be narcotic substances and the
defendant was charged with possession of narcotics. The court sustained the defendant's
fourth amendment claim stating:
If we accept the officer's testimony that he did not search the defendant's trousers
before handing them to him, it is clear that he was not concerned about the neces-
sity of protecting himself from attack or that he feared an attempt to escape ....
[W]e see no justification other than curiosity for the officer's conduct in entering
the bedroom after the defendant had left it and taking possession of the box.
Id. at 452. Thus, Williams represents an adoption of a standard similar to that imposed
in Machroli, one which is reasonably related to the underlying rationale of Chimel. But
see People v. Doss, 256 N.E.2d 753 (Ill. 1970) (search of a nearby bed upheld with the
court stating simply that it was clearly within the bounds of Chimel).
The lower courts have followed the lead of the Supreme Court of Illinois. Compare
People v. Holmes, 313 N.E.2d 297 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (search tinder a mattress five feet
from the arrestee held valid since no officer was positioned between the bed and the
arrestee) with People v. Hines, 267 N.E.2d 696 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971) (pre-Chimel search
of a room while the defendant stood in the hallway held valid).
118. See Neal v. State, 250 So. 2d 605 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 1971) (pre-Chfmel
search not incident to arrest since the officers were not searching for weapons which
might endanger them or be used in an escape and there was no evidence of the crime for
which the defendant was arrested).
119. See Berlin v. State, 277 A.2d 468 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1971) (area of immediate
control measured reasonably with respect to the accessibility of the articles and their
nature); Scott v. State, 256 A.2d 384 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1969); State v. Henderson,
510 S.W.2d 813 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (fact that the officer did not feel threatened was
not important since the arrestee was not handcuffed and could reach the area
searched); cf. Gonzales v. State, 507 P.2d 1277 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1973); Fields v.
State, 463 P.2d 1000 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1970).
Two states have rejected that the officer must have some reason to believe that a
search is necessary or that evidence of the particular crime be present, but have not
defined their approach in other respects. See State v. Culver, 288 A.2d 279 (Del. 1972);
People v. Stergowski, 219 N.W.2d 68 (Mich. 1974).
120. Indeed, some courts have had little opportunity to express an opinion as to the
correct interpretation of Chimel. See Harris v. Commonwealth, 469 S.W.2d 68 (Ky.
1971); Lugar v. Commonwealth, 202 S.E.2d 894 (Va. 1974).
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its ease of application and the possible "windfall" that criminal defend-
ants may enjoy under the factual analysis test do not realize that the
flexibility of the factual analysis test more readily admits to exceptions to
the general rule without violating the underpinnings of the search
incident to arrest exception. Thus, it can accommodate legitimate police
conduct within specific constitutional limits.
III. EXPANDING THE PERMISSIBLE SCOPE
Given the restrictions that Chimel placed upon the area which may
be searched incident to arrest, courts have been quick to formulate
theories by which to expand the permissible scope. One method of
enlarging the permissible scope is to redefine the area of the arrestee's
immediate control in certain situations. This is not only consistent with,
but also mandated by the underlying considerations of the Chimel
immediate control rule: preservation of evidence and protection of the
arresting officers. A second method of expanding the allowable scope
is to permit searches beyond the immediate control of the arrestee,
however defined. Technically an "exception" to the immediate control
rule, this second method is based on the protection of police officers,
which, even when taken alone, is deemed to make reasonable an ex-
tended search in specified circumstances.
A. Extensions of the Arrestee's Control
The presence of known third parties in close proximity to the area
searched has been held to extend the permissible area of a search
incident to arrest on the basis that such third parties represent an ex-
tension of the defendant's control. In United States v. Manarite'21 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld as being within the bounds
of Chimel the seizure of items from an end table near which several
unidentified persons were standing at the time of the defendant's ar-
rest.12  While the items were not within the actual physical control
of the defendant at the time of the arrest, the court reasoned that
[t]he F.B.I. agents were justified in assuming that these persons might
be accomplices of those arrested and hence might attempt to destroy evi-
dence or procure a weapon on behalf of the appellants.
23
121. 448 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 947 (1971).
122. Id. at 593.
123. Id.
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In a subsequent opinion this same court, which generally has used a
factual analysis test,124 implied that the Manarite holding was to be
limited to the particular fact pattern involved therein. 25
State v. Mayer126 represents a more confined application by the
Vermont court of the "possible accomplices" rationale to extend the
scope of searches. In Mayer a gun was seized from an area near an
accomplice of the defendant for whom the police also had an arrest
warrant.12 7  It is unclear whether the court, in upholding the search,
was relying on the arrest of the accomplice, or the mere fact of her
presence in the room with the defendant.' 28  Although the Vermont
court has not addressed the issue since that time, it appears that so long
as the factual situation does in fact indicate that there is a person present
who may attempt to assist the arrestee, then the extension of the scope of
the search would not violate the Chimel limitations. In such instances
124. See notes 99-106 supra and accompanying text.
125. United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 81 n.15 (2d Cir. 1973). In Mapp the court
distinguished the facts therein (see notes 95-99 supra) from Manarite by concluding that
the possible accomplices theory set forth in Manarite
is wholly inapplicable to the facts in this case where no unidentified, suspected ac-
complices were found standing in [the occupant's] room or near her bedroom
closet.
476 F.2d at 81 n.15.
In Manarite, the court of appeals stated that it completely agreed with the denial of
the motion to suppress evidence by the judge in the district court. 448 F.2d at 593. The
lower court gave much more attention to detail. United States v. Manarite, 314 F. Supp.
607, 615-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 448 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1971). Among the facts set
forth in the district court opinion were the facts that the officers, prior to searching the
area near two persons, had found a gun on the premises; that the two persons were not
restrained in any manner; and that no one was between the persons and the area
searched. Id. at 615. The court then stated that
[b]oth men had apparently been sleeping in the .. . apartment and were likely
relatives or intimate friends of the [defendant]. Since they were both in full
view of [the defendant], who had already been placed under arrest, it would be
reasonable for the agents to assume that if [the defendant] had signalled the two
unidentified men, they would have been able to reach over and draw a weapon
out of the end tables.
Id. The emphasis by the court upon the inferences that could be drawn from the facts
known to the officers and leading to the conclusion that the persons were accomplices,
indicates that the basis for the assumption that the other persons represented an
extension of the arrestee's control is the "connection in crime" between the two.
126. 283 A.2d 863 (Vt. 1971).
127. Id. at 864.
128. It cannot be discerned from the opinion whether the accomplice was in fact
arrested. Thus the basis for the court's opinion becomes even less clear. It may be
argued that more than mere presence is required. But United States v. Berryhill, 445
F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1971), suggests that under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the
fact that a person is with an arrestee would give a law enforcement officer the authority
to conduct a patdown search of that person. 445 F.2d at 1193.
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the search would be limited to the reasons which make it justifiable to
search without a warrant in the first place.12 9
The most widely used and recognized method of expanding the
definition of the arrestee's control is to include those areas that will be or
would have been under the control of the defendant. This theory
usually is applied when the arrestee must change his or her clothing or
obtain a jacket or some other item of clothing before being removed
from the premises where the arrest occurred. 130 In such cases the
extension of the arrestee's control is consonant with both the fourth
amendment and Chimel. This is particularly true where the arrestee
requests permission to obtain an item or to be allowed access to a
particular area. 131 The arresting officers are faced with the alternatives
of denying the request, obtaining the item themselves, or searching the
area before the arrestee retrieves the item or is otherwise permitted
access to the area. Courts have held that either of the two latter courses
are permissible.'32
129. The possible accomplices exception which allows a search based on the theory
that another person present represents an extension of the arrestee's control should be
distinguished from the "protective sweep" exception to the Chimel limitation. This
latter exception allows the officer to extend the scope of the search to other rooms in
order to determine if confederates of the arrestee, who may assist the arrestee in resisting
arrest or destroying evidence, are present. See notes 150-75 infra and accompanying
text. Of course, the two exceptions may arise in the same situation.
130. See, e.g., United States ex reL Falconer v. Pate, 319 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Ill.
1970) (dictum), afi'd mnem., 478 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1094
(1973); Commonwealth v. Davenport, 308 A.2d 85 (Pa. 1973); Goodner v. State, 464
S.W.2d 339 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. 1971) (dictum).
131. In such situations there is a basis for finding an implied consent to the extended
search. See W. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 231, at 290
(1972); note 148 infra.
132. See, e.g., United States v. DeMarsh, 360 F. Supp. 132, 137 n.4 (E.D. Wis. 1973)
(search of bathroom permissible before allowing arrestee to use as requested); Parker v.
Swenson, 332 F. Supp. 1225, 1232-33 (E.D. Mo. 1971), affd, 459 F.2d 164 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1126 (1973) (search of bag from locker permissible when
arrestee requested permission to remove belongings from locker when arrested at place of
employment); United States v. Manarite, 314 F. Supp. 607, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd,
448 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 947 (1971) (where agent obtained
clothing for the arrestee he could properly search it; if he had let the arrestee obtain the
clothing he could search closet from which clothing was taken); Curry v. Superior Court,
7 Cal. App. 3d 836, 849-50, 86 Cal. Rptr. 844, 852-53 (1970) (officers could search the
bathroom prior to allowing arrestee to enter to change clothing); Neam v. State, 286
A.2d 540, 543 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972) (arrestee requested officer to obtain wallet
from other room; evidence seen in plain view validly seized); Commonwealth v.
Davenport, 308 A.2d 85, 89 (Pa. 1973) (evidence seen in plain view while retrieving
arrestee's clothing from closet validly seized).
United States ex rel. Falconer v. Pate, 319 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Ill. 1970), affd mem.,
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In those cases where there is no clear necessity for the arrestee to go
to the area searched, the enlargement may not be clearly within the
Chimel rationale. In such cases the courts will often rely upon a
combined theory of consent, vis-d-vis the arrestee's request, and plain
view.' Consequently, when the arrestee's removal to an area is bot-
tomed on a police request or suggestion the consent fiction is weakened
and the courts scrutinize the reasonableness and purpose of the re-
quest." 4 For example, in Walker v. United States 85 agents went to
the defendant's home at six a.m. to execute an arrest warrant issued for
the defendant for armed robbery.' 36 According to the officers' estima-
tions, the defendant was not properly dressed. They asked the defend-
ant where he kept his clothes. After the defendant stated his willing-
ness to go to the police station as attired, the officers went to the room
indicated by the defendant, looked into a closet, and found evidence of
the robbery for which he was arrested.' 37 The court held that the
search was proper since the closet was an area within the control of the
arrestee at the time he was directed to obtain additional clothing.1
88
The courts generally are in harmony as to the acceptability of an
extension of the arrestee's control based on his or her need to don proper
attire.
13 9
Problems arise, however, when the arresting officers ask the arrestee
to reveal the location of evidence. In United States v. Kee Ming Hsu,40
478 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1094 (1973), set forth the rationale of
the extension of the scope of the search in dictum:
LThe] rationale [of Chimel] compels the conclusion that the police may constitu-
tionally conduct a warrantless search of any item that necessarily must be placed
on the arrestee's person or within his immediate control in order to remove him
from the place of arrest and take him into custody, notwithstanding that such item
at the initial time of arrest may have been beyond the permissible search area under
Chimel.
Id. at 213 (emphasis added).
133. United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 81-82 n.15 (2d Cir. 1973).
134. The mere fact that an arresting officer has asked a question regarding the
location of an evidentiary item will not by itself invalidate a search. See People v.
Brown, 266 N.E.2d 131, 135 (Ill. Ct. App. 1970).
135. 318 A.2d 290 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974).
136. Id. at 290-91.
137. Id. at 291.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., United States v. Mulligan, 488 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 930 (1974); Giacalone v. Lucas, 445 F.2d 1238 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 922 (1972). Cf. United States v. Rothberg, 460 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1972)
(officer asked location of arrestee's wallet in order to determine his identity; arrestee did
not have it on his person and officer, therefore, could go into another room to retrieve
it).
-140: 424 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 982 (1971).
[Vol. 9
1976] PREMISES SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARRESTS 379
the defendant was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant at the entrance
to his apartment. One of the arresting agents asked him where he kept
a pistol that was known to have been used in connection with the
fraudulent scheme for which he was arrested. 4' The defendant then
led the agent to a cupboard some thirty feet away and as the defendant
reached into it the agent stopped him and then removed a pistol. 4 ' By
the time the agent had the pistol in his possession, the defendant had
begun to back into a room four to five feet away, and, as the officer
unloaded the weapon, both he and the defendant found themselves in a
bedroom that was subsequently searched. 143 The court held that the
search was valid under Chimel since the items seized in the bedroom
were within the area from which the defendant could have obtained a
weapon.144 The court further stated:
Although the arrest was at the entrance door to the apartment, it would
be unreasonable to restrict the search to the area immediately adjacent
to the entrance door in view of the fact that the request for Hsu's wea-
pon lead to the cupboard and to the combined bedroom and office
[where the items were seized]. 1
45
On its face, Kee Ming Hsu gives considerable latitude to officers to
expand the permissible scope of the search. Wisely, the case has not led
to broad acceptance of the propriety of officers asking the arrestee
where evidentiary items are located in order to enlarge the permissible
area of the search.'46 If not construed in a limited manner, the case
could be taken as authority to allow the officers to move the arrestee
from room to room in order to conduct an area search of each room.
47
141. The defendant was engaged in a rather intricate fraud scheme. He claimed that
he had been sent to the United States from Free China by Chiang Kai Shek to collect
contributions to a fund to organize resistance to a possible coup being organized by
Madame Chiang Kai Shek and the Red Chinese. The defendant displayed pictures of
himself with the Generalissimo to prospective contributors. He also showed these
persons a gun which he claimed he was forced to carry at all times since he was in
continual danger of death. Id. at 1288. This was the gun referred to by the arresting
officer.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1289.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., United States v. Marotta, 326 F. Supp. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), af'd
mem., 456 F.2d 1336 (2d Cir. 1972) (in an arrest for illegal sale of firearms the officer's
request to show him where guns were located was not motivated by regard for his own
safety; search held invalid).
147. See, e.g., United States v. Castellana, 369 F. Supp. 376 (M.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd,
488 F.2d 65, modified, 500 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1974); Henry v. State, 494 P.2d 661
(Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1972).
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To allow an officer to expand the scope of a search by purposely
extending the area within the arrestee's control would be to directly
circumvent the guarantees of the fourth amendment as interpreted by
Chimel. However, police conduct in such situations is not without
limitation. A proper analysis of the consent and plain view issues
should be sufficient to invalidate the more objectionable police prac-
tices.148  Thus, a limited and controlled relaxation of the Chimel limi-
tations is legitimate.
B. Extensions of Scope Based on Protective Purposes
The Chimel Court stated that the considerations which allow a search
of the person of the arrestee and the area within the arrestee's immediate
control do not justify a search of other rooms. Btt the language was
couched in terms of a prohibition against "routinely searching any room
other than that in which an arrest occurs.' 49  The Court seemingly left
open the possibility that if the search was not routine and was motivated
by some articulable reason which related to either the safety of the
148. The Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), stated in regard
to waivers of constitutional rights that
"courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" of fundamental con-
stitutional rights and that we "do not presume acquiescence in the loss of funda-
mental rights." A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandon-
ment of a known right or privilege.
Id. at 464, citing Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937); Ohio Bell Tel.
Co. v. PUC, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937); Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882).
See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191 (1957). In the specific context of con-
sent to searches and seizures, the Supreme Court has stated:
When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search,
he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily
given. This burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence
to a claim of lawful authority.
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968). In Bumper the Supreme Court
found no consent to a search when the party merely allowed the officers into the home
when presented with a search warrant that later was found to be deficient. Id. at .546.
Thus, when the request by a law enforcement officer presents such coercion that the
arrestee cannot be said to have voluntarily consented to the request, the search would be
overturned. See Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'g 439 F.2d 913 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972); Leavitt v. Howard, 462 F.2d 992 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 884 (1972) (rejecting claim that a defendant would never
voluntarily consent to a search where he or she knew it would lead to incriminating
evidence).
The limitations set forth by the Court on the plain view exception to the warrant
requirement would impose additional limitations to the officer's authority and ability to
search areas outside the scope limitations of Chimel. See Note, "Plain View"-
Anything But Plain: Coolidge Divides the Lower Courts, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 489
(1974).
149. 395 U.S. at 763.
1976] PREMISES SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARRESTS 381
arresting officer or the protection of evidence, the search extending
beyond the actual range of the arrestee's control would be permissible.
Federal courts were quick to develop the perimeters of such an excep-
tion to the immediate control rule of Chimel.
In United States v. Briddle5 ° the defendant was arrested at his home
pursuant to an arrest warrant. The agents also had a search warrant
that proved to be defective; nonetheless, at the moment of the defend-
ant's arrest in the entry hall the officers "fanned out" to determine if
there were others present who would hinder their operations. 151 The
court upheld the seizure of an item found in plain view while the agent
was exercising his "right to conduct a quick and cursory viewing of the
apartment area for the presence of other persons who might present a
security risk. '152 The opinion did not require that the officers testify as
to any specific facts leading them to believe that such a search was
necessary. In view of this, the opinion could be read as establishing an
unconditional right to search; however, the right of the officers to make
a protective sweep was not in issue in the case as the court noted that the
right to do so was a "conceded right." '53
While other federal courts have also allowed the "protective sweep"
argument of Briddle, they have demanded that there be some existing
condition that leads the officer to conclude reasonably that the sweep is
necessary.154 In United States v. Basurto55 the defendant was arrested
on the front lawn of his home for conspiracy to import marijuana.
150. 436 F.2d 4 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 921 (1971).
151. Id. at 6.
152. Id. at 7.
153. Id.
154. See United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Samuels, 374 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1974); United States v. Broomfield, 336 F. Supp.
179 (E.D. Mich. 1972). The Fifth Circuit is the only court to adopt the exception as
set out in Briddle. See United States v. Looney, 481 F.2d 31 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1070 (1973), wherein the court harmonized the exception with Chimel as
follows:
[WMe are of the view that neither the revered principles of the Fourth Amendment
nor the limitations of Chimel are traduced by allowing officers to make a cursory
security search to protect their lives. . . . The district court dwelt on the fact that
the area subject to [defendants'] immediate control was secure. This misses the
point. The important thing is that after [the defendants] were made immobile the
agents were instructed to look through the house for people that might be in hiding
and be a danger to the safety of the agents, and not to look for things. Of course,
once this security precaution had been taken, any further search without a warrant
was prohibited.
It is manifest that here the agents were not "routinely searching any room
other than that in which [the] arrest occurs;" Chimel . . . . Indeed, the agents
were not engaged in a Fourth Amendment search at all.
Id. at 32-33.
155. 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974).
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When arrested he yelled, "It's the police!"' 56 The arresting agents ran
to the house to see if anyone was inside and, if so, whether anyone
present was armed.sT While the court concluded that because the ar-
rest took place outside the house the search could not possibly be up-
held as incident to an arrest,' 58 its analysis clarifies the basis upon
which the protective sweep extension is justified. In its proper context
it is not so much an exception to the immediate control rule as it is
a factual circumstance falling butside any of the limitations of the
search incident to an arrest.
The Basurto court correctly analyzed the protective sweep justifica-
tion for a warrantless search as a combination of exigent circumstances
and plain view. 159 Under the rubric of exigent circumstances officers
are allowed to search without a warrant when, under the facts of the
case, to do otherwise could endanger police safety and subvert lawful
and legitimate police apprehension of criminals. 60 As summarized by
the court in Basurto:
The circumstances considered "exigent" were stated [by the, Supreme
Court in Vale v. Louisiana] to include responding to an emergency; the
hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; the ongoing destruction of the goods ulti-
mately seized; and the removal of those goods from the jurisdiction.' 01
The conditioning of the protective sweep upon the existence of exigent
circumstances makes it more easily reconcilable with Chimel and the
fourth amendment. If there is no requirement of at least a good faith
belief on the officer's part that the further intrusion is necessary, then
the protective sweep takes on characteristics of a routine search of rooms
other than that in which the arrest occurs, notwithstanding the fact that
the items seized may only be those in plain view. The Seventh Circuit
has rejected the protective sweep argument, perhaps partially for these
reasons.
In United States v. Gamble0 2 the officers executed an arrest warrant
at 12:30 a.m. After announcing their purpose and authority, they
heard some noises inside and broke in with guns drawn. They then
156. Id. at 787.
157. Id. The agent who entered the home testified that he had known at the time of
the entry that the defendant had earlier been in possession of a weapon. Id.
158. Id. at 788.
159. Id. at 788-90.
160. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967); note 2 supra.
161. 497 F.2d at 789.
162. 473 F.2d 1274 (7th Cir. 1973).
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placed the defendant under arrest in the kitchen, and looked throughout
the entire apartment. 1 3 Notwithstanding the fact that a number of
other persons were present, the court rejected the government's claim
that it could make a protective sweep of the premises. Casting the
issue in light of the proper scope of a search incident to arrest, the court
found that since the defendant had been placed against a wall and
frisked and that since the area was within his immediate control had been
secured, the search was not incident to arrest under Chimel.0 4 Addi-
tionally, the court found that the factors set forth 0 5 did not constitute
exigent circumstances. Moreover, the court viewed the protective
sweep not just as an exception to the Chimel immediate control rule,
but as an independent exception to the warrant requirement. Conse-
quently, it could not classify the protective sweep as ne of the well-
recognized exceptions referred to in Chimel,166 and it also refused to
create a new exception to the warrant requirement.
067
Several state courts have adopted the protective sweep approach used
in the federal courts.' 68  California, however, has adopted what appears
163. Id. at 1275-76.
164. Id. at 1276-77.
165. The government, according to the court, did not rely upon the "feared presence
of dangerous criminal suspects other than (the defendant]." Id. at 1277. Rather, the
government listed a series of factors which it believed amounted to exigent circum-
stances. Three of the factors set forth related to information that the police had prior to
effecting the arrest and which the court concluded could have been presented to a
magistrate. Id. The government also contended that the officers had heard rusting
noises in the house after announcing their purpose and authority. The court concluded
that as to this factor
police officers will almost always be confronted with "rustling" noises when they
knock on the door of an occupied home late at night; the party inside must awake,
prepare himself to answer, and walk to the door. We think that arresting police
must show considerably more than this to justify a search beyond Chimel limits
Id. Finally, the government pointed to factors indicating that the defendant was a
violent person. The court reasoned that this type of characteristic was considered by the
Court in Chinel and justified only a search of the area within the immediate control of
the arrestee. Id.
166. Id. at 1276.
167. The Seventh Circuit again rejected the protective sweep claim of the government
in United States v. Cooks, 493 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 996
(1975).
168. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 316 A.2d 16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) (search
of an attic based on noises heard therein after arrest lawful if motivated by the belief
that someone was secreted there); People v. Sturgis, 352 N.Y.S.2d 942 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
Co., Spec. Narc. Ct. 1973) (search of entire apartment and suitcase found therein valid
since there had been a twenty to thirty minute gun fight prior to the arrest with an
undetermined number of persons); State v. Jennings, 192 S.E.2d 46 (N.C. Ct. App.
1972) (valid for police to search after a gun battle with an undetermined number of
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to be a more limited application of the exception. In People v. Block 0 0
officers went to an address where they believed there was a narcotics
suspect. After being admitted to the home, they saw six or seven
persons on the downstairs level whom they believed had been using
marijuana °.7  Additionally, they found a smoldering marijuana
"roach" and two pipes lying in plain view.' Based on these facts, the
court concluded that the officers reasonably could deduce that a mari-
juana party was indeed in progress and that there were an undetermined
number of participants.172  Therefore the court held that the officer was
entitled to proceed to the upstairs portion of the home to determine if
any accomplices were present. 173 It also held that any evidence seen in
plain view while looking for accomplices was properly seized and admit-
ted into evidence.
1 4
The California court subsequently made it clear that for such a search
to be constitutionally permissible and within the Chimel limitations, the
officers would have to be able to conclude, and in fact have concluded,
from the facts within their knowledge that accomplices possibly were
present in the home. 71 This application of the protective sweep excep-
tion seems to be more narrowly limited to the protection of officers and
the preservation of evidence than are other courts' approaches. It does
not indulge in a presumption that there are others present who would
persons); Nichols v. State, 501 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1973) (possibility of
the presence of others justifies a search of room other than that in which the arrest oc-
curs); State v. Toliver, 487 P.2d 264 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (search of a dwelling valid
when officers have probable cause to believe that those persons inside might fire upon
them). Cf. Watson v. State, 306 A.2d 599 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973).
169. 6 Cal. 3d 239, 499 P.2d 961, 103 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1971).
170. Id. at 242, 499 P.2d at 962, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 245, 499 P.2d at 964, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 284.
173. Id. at 246, 499 P.2d at 965, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 285. The decision in Block
accepted the prior decision of the court of appeal in Guevara v. Superior Court, 7 Cal.
App. 3d 531, 86 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1970), wherein the court held that the search of a room
other than the room of the arrest could be justified if the officer had a reasonable fear
that someone therein might attack. In that case the officer had the additional informa-
tion that evidence of the very crime for which the defendant was arrested would be
located in the room he entered subsequent to the arrest.
174. 6 Cal. 3d at 246, 499 P.2d at 965, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
175. See Dillon v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 305, 497 P.2d 505, 102 Cal. Rptr. 161
(1972). In that case the court found that there was insufficient evidence from which
the officers could conclude that accomplices were present. The defendant had been ar-
rested outside of her home for cultivating marijuana plants. The court said the mere fact
that others were known to live there and that they had been seen working with the plants
in the backyard did not provide a sufficient justification for entry into the home. Id.
at 314, 497 P.2d at 511, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
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aid the arrestee. Thus, it is more appropriately considered an exception
to the scope limitations rather than as an independent exception to
the warrant requirement.
It cannot be denied that there are certain situations which call for an
abrogation of the immediate control limitations of Chimel. However, in
allowing for such exceptions or expansions, it should be recognized that
the factual analysis approach more readily accommodates itself to these
expansions. The exceptions to the immediate control rule are all tied to
the original justifications for the allowance of a warrantless search.
Because the physical proximity test, in initially defining the permissible
scope of a search incident to arrest, ignores the rationale of this excep-
tion to the warrant requirement, it results in a confusing duality ap-
proach. Searches within a predefined radius are per se reasonable,
regardless of the abilities of the arrestee, while expansions beyond that
radius must be related to the destruction of evidence or protection of
officers. On the other hand, because the factual analysis test defines the
initial scope and any expansions with reference to the abilities of the
arrestee, it allows the courts to adopt a single uniform interpretation and
application of Chimel.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
While the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of the correct
interpretation of the immediate control rule as it relates to searches of
premises incident to arrest,' 76 it has recently considered the permissible
scope of the search of a person incident to arrest. In United States v.
Robinson 77 and Gustafson v. Florida178 the Supreme Court validated,
as consonant with the Constitution, a full person search of a custodial
arrestee, regardless of the facts that there was no evidence of the crime
for which the person was arrested and that the arresting officers did not
express any fear for their safety. 79 In part, the Court's decision was
based upon its statement in Robinson that
[t]he authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest,
while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not
176. See note 17 supra.
177. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
178. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
179. Both Robinson and Gustafson involved the question of the permissible limits of a
search of the person incident to a full-custody arrest for a traffic offense. In identical
language in Robinson and Gustafson the Court explicitly stated that "it is of no
moment that [the arresting officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee]
or that he did not himself suspect that the [arrestee] was armed." United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973).
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depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a par-
ticular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found
upon the person of the suspect.' s0
Based upon this language, several courts have indicated their belief
that even though the justifications for the initiation of a warrantless
search are dissipated, the search may nonetheless continue. In United
States v. Kaye""' the defendant's suitcase had been seized when he was
arrested at an airport. The court upheld the search of the suitcase made
after the defendant was in custody, based on the fact that it was within
his immediate control "at the time of the arrest.'8 2 The court reached
this result by bootstrapping the above language from Robinson into the
immediate control rule, reasoning that
[fi]t is true, as Appellant contends, that Appellant had been subdued
and presented no danger to the police at the time the suitcase was
opened. Nor was there the possibility that the evidence in the suitcase
would be destroyed as the suitcase was under the control of the police.
However, the authority to conduct a search incident to an arrest, once
established, still exists even after the need to disarm and prevent the de-
struction of evidence have [sic] been dispelled. 18
While Kaye did not involve the search of a premises incident to arrest,
the reasoning has been applied to such searches of premises. In
United States v. Bradley"" the defendant threw a bag he was hold-
ing at the time of the arrest into an adjoining room. 85 In finding
that the item was properly seized incident to arrest, the court relied on
the fact that the item was within the defendant's immediate control at
the instant of the arrest and remained in plain view thereafter. The
court concluded that Chimel "did not erect impenetrable barriers at
180. 414 U.S. at 235. Justice Powell, concurring, was even clearer. He stated:
No reason ... exists to frustrate law enforcement by requiring some independent
justification for a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest. This seems to me
the reason that a valid arrest justifies a full search of the person, even if that search
is not narrowly limited by the twin rationales of seizing evidence and disarming
the arrestee.
Id. at 237 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
181. 492 F.2d 744 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
182. Id. at 746 (emphasis added).
183. Id. The decision in Kaye is consistent with earlier cases decided by the Sixth
Circuit court which did not set forth its reasoning. See United States v. Burch, 471 F.2d
1314 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Robbins, 424 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1970). See the
criticism of the court's approach in the dissenting opinion of Judge McCree in Robbins,
raising a question as to whether a suitcase could ever be within the immediate control of
the arrestee. Id. at 59.
184. 455 F.2d 1181 (lst Cir. 1972), affd, 410 U.S. 605 (1973).
185. Id. at 1187.
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every doorway."'"" Thus, by construing a search to be one of the
person of the arrestee rather than of the premises, the courts have
allowed searohes to extend beyond the scope limitations of Chimel.
The more significant implication of the post-Chimel Supreme Court
decisions is the support that may be found therein for the physical
proximity test. In addition to Robinson and Gustafson, the Supreme
Court has addressed the issue of a searoh of the person incident to arrest
in United States v. Edwards.8 7 In that case the defendant was arrested
for attempting to break into a post office and was taken into custody
late at night.' 8 The next morning, believing that some paint chips,
which would be evidence of the crime for which he was arrested, could
be found in the clothing, the police gave Edwards some new clothing
and took his clothing as evidence. 8 9  An examination of the clothing
revealed paint chips which matched the paint on the building that he
was suspected of attempting to break into.'90 In denying that the de-
fendant's fourth amendment rights ,had been violated by the introduc-
tion into evidence of the paint chips, the Court stated that the seizure
186. Id. State v. Boyd, 492 S.W.2d 787 (Mo.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1069 (1973),
applied the same reasoning in upholding the search of an attache case seized from the
defendant at the time of the arrest and searched at a security office 150 feet away. The
court went further than either Kaye or Bradley, and limited the applicability of Chimel
to exclude such situations. Id. at 791.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals apparently relies on an approach based on the
immediate control at the time of the arrest. See United States v. Rothman, 492 F.2d
1260 (9th Cir. 1973). However, an alternative theory was developed by that court for
the warrantless searches of suitcases in United States v. Mehciz, 437 F.2d 145 (9th Cir.
1971). In Mehciz the defendant was arrested and handcuffed before a suitcase in his
possession was taken from him and searched. The court rejected the appellant's claim
that incident to the arrest the officers could lawfully only hold the suitcase until they
obtained a warrant for a search. Over a strong dissent by Judge Ely, the court reasoned
that the suitcase was like an automobile in its potential for mobility and hence if
probable cause existed the suitcase could be searched without a warrant pursuant to the
mobility exception formulated in Carroll and Chambers. Id. at 147. The decision has
been the subject of controversy and has begun a debate concerning the applicability of
the mobility exception to suitcases and other moveable containers. See Note, Mobility
Reconsidered. Extending the Carroll Doctrine to Movable Items, 58 IowA L. Rlv. 1134
(1973); 9 HoUSTON L. Rlv. 140 (1971). Nonetheless, several courts have adopted the
reasoning. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 467 F.2d 630 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 413
U.S. 920 (1972); Waugh v. State, 318 A.2d 204 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974), rev'd, 338
A.2d 268 (1975); Commonwealth v. Duran, 293 N.E.2d 285 (Mass. 1973). See the
dissent of Justices White, Douglas, and Brennan to denial of certiorari in Nugent v.
United States, 409 U.S. 1065 (1972).
187. 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
188. Id. at 801.
189. Id. at 801-02.
190. Id. at 802.
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was and is a normal incident of a custodial arrest, and reasonable delay
in effectuating it does not change the fact that Edwards was no more
imposed upon than he could have been at the time and place of the ar-
rest or immediately upon arrival at the place of detention. 191
The purport of the Court's reasoning is clear when Robinson, Gustaf-
son, and Edwards are taken together. The language of these cases'92
appears to support the proposition that the justifications which exist to
conduct a warrantless search at the moment of arrest are not dissipated
by a reasonable delay in effecting the search. If this reasoning can be
applied to the determination of the scope of the searoh incident to arrest,
it would appear to support the physical proximity test. That is, if at the
moment of arrest an area is within the immediate control of the arrestee,
then, notwithstanding the fact that the arrestee subsequently may be
restrained or removed from the area, a search of the area would be
valid.1
93
Edwards also supports the physical proximity test on another basis.
As noted earlier, some courts which rely on the physical proximity test
do so because it takes into consideration the reasonableness 'of the
police conduct."9 4 This position, rejected by the majority in Chimel
and finding support only in the dissent, 9 5 appears to have been
resurrected by the majority in Edwards. The majority in Edwards
stated that the test was "not whether it was reasonable to procure a
search warrant, but whether the search itself was reasonable. .... 19
Thus, as the dissent pointed out, the Court was departing from its
earlier position that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless
they fall "within one of the 'jealously and carefully drawn' exceptions to
-the warrant requirement."' 97  Additionally, the Edwards Court relied
upon the fact that the procedures therein were in accord with police
practices in the area and noted that while "'[a] rule of practice must
not be allowed. . . to prevail over a constitutional right,' little doubt
has ever been expressed about the validity or reasonableness of such
searches incident to incarceration."' 98  To the extent the Court may
have been relying on the practicalities of the situation as justification for
191. Id. at 805.
192. See text accompanying notes 180, 191 supra.
193. That some courts have adopted this line of reasoning is clear. See text
accompanying note 66 supra; notes 63-75 supra and accompanying text.
194. See notes 77, 79 supra and accompanying text.
195. See notes 80-83 supra and accompanying text.
196. 415 U.S. at 807.
197. Id. at 809 (footnote omitted).
198. Id. at 804-05 n.6 (citation omitted).
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the search, it is indeed a shift in the Court's policy regarding the fourth
amendment.
Notwithstanding portions of Robinson, Gustafson, and Edwards
which may support the physical proximity test interpretation of the
immediate control rule of Chimel, there are significant distinctions
between the search of a person incident to arrest considered in those
cases and the search of a premises incident to arrest. In fact, the
Court in both Robinson and Gustafson gave particular recognition to
the distinction that exists between the search of the person and the
search of a premises incident to arrest.199 Likewise, in Edwards there
199. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 225-26, 228-29 (1973); Gustafson v.
Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 264 (1973). The Court in Robinson stated:
It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception
to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. This general exception has
historically been formulated into two distinct propositions. The first is that a
search may be made of the person of the arrestee by virtue of the fact of the lawful
arrest. The second is that a search may be made of the area within the immediate
control of the arrestee.
Examination of this Court's decisions show that these two propositions have
been treated quite differently. The validity of the search of the person incident
to a lawful arrest has been regarded as settled since its first enunciation, and has
remained virtually unchallenged until the present case. The validity of the second
proposition, while likewise conceded in principle, has been subject to differing in-
terpretations as to the extent of the area which may be searched.
414 U.S. at 224.
The Court then discussed the petitioner's authority for the assertion that a search of a
person incident to arrest must be limited in scope to the need to preserve evidence and
protect officers. Interestingly, and correctly, the petitioner relied not on Chimel, but on
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). In Sibron the Court dealt specifically with
the search of a person incident to arrest, holding 'that an officer had the right to search
an arrestee because he had probable cause to arrest him. The Court stated that at the
time of the arrest the arresting officer
had the authority to search [petitioner] Peters, and the incident search was obvi-
ously justified "by the need to seize weapons and other things which might be used
to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the de-
struction of evidence of the crime." Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367
(1964). Moreover, it was reasonably limited in scope by these purposes. he
arresting officer] did not engage in an unrestrained and thorough-going examination
of Peters and his personal effects.
392 U.S. at 67; see note 12 supra.
The Robinson Court, stated in regard to this passage that "lt is, of course, possible
to read the second sentence from this quotation as imposing a novel limitation on the
established doctrine set forth in the first sentence." 414 U.S. at 229. The Court then
went on to state that while Chimel quoted the above language with approval, it was pre-
ceded "by a full exposition of the traditional and unqualified authority of the arresting
officer to' search the arrestee's person." Id. (citation omitted). The Court concluded
that it "did not believe that the Court in Peters [sic] intended in one unexplained and
unelaborated sentence to impose a novel and far-reaching limitation on the authority to
search the person of an arrestee incident to his lawful arrest." Id. Thus, the Court
also recognized that a different standard can be applied to the search of a person inci-
dent to arrest as opposed to the search of a premises incident to arrest. The distinction
drawn, and the Court's acknowledgment that Chimel established a more restrictive stand-
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was no need to discuss the search of a premises as the facts and the
Court's language clearly established that the Court was dealing only
with the search of a person.20 ° Despite the fact that these cases may
foreshadow a less restrictive interpretation of the immediate control rule,
vis-h-vis the right of the officers to search a larger area, they are
distinguishable authority upon which to base a conclusion that the
physical proximity test is the correct application of the immediate con-
trol rule. As noted earlier 20 1 the factual analysis test best comports with
the rationale underlying Chimel. Until such time as that rationale is
reconsidered and repudiated in the specific context of a search of a
premises incident to arrest, the lower courts should apply the immediate
control rule with regard to the actual abilities of the arrestee.
V. CONCLUSION
Chimel v. California20 2 placed definite limitations upon the area of a
premises search incident to arrest. However, the language used by the
Court to define the permissible scope of such searches-the area within
the immediate control of the arrestee-has been variously interpreted by
the lower courts. On the one hand are those courts which believe that
the area of immediate control is to be measured by the hypothetical
ability of the arrestee to reach the area searched. Under this physical
proximity test, a predefined area is always deemed to be within the
arrestee's immediate control.2 °3 On the other hand are those courts
ard to be applied to searches of premises, signifies that the Court was not dealing with
the rationale and limitation of the area of a search of a premises incident to arrest.
Robinson therefore should not be binding authority in the interpretation of the immedi-
ate control rule.
200. The evidence seized from the petitioner in Edwards was paint chips found in his
clothing. The issue in the case was whether a search incident to arrest could lawfully be
conducted once the administrative mechanics of the arrest had been completed. 415
U.S. at 802. Holding that the search could constitutionally be made after the arrest
mechanics had halted, the Court concluded by agreeing with the First Circuit Court of
Appeals that
"[w]hile the legal arrest of a person should not destroy the privacy of his premises,
it does-for at least a reasonable time and to a reasonable extent-take his own pri-
vacy out of the realm of protection from police interest in weapons, means of es-
cape, and evidence."
Id. at 809, quoting United States v. DeLeo, 422 F.2d 487, 493 (1970) (footnote
omitted). This recognition of the differing interest involved in the search of a person
incident to arrest and the search of a premises incident to arrest again indicates that the
Court could recognize that a different standard applies to each search situation.
201. See notes 79-120 supra and accompanying text.
202. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
203. See notes 20-78 supra and accompanying text,
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which look to the actual ability of the arrestee to determine if the area is
within the immediate control. This approach, the factual analysis test,
generally calls for an examination of the facts surrounding the search,
including the number of officers present, the distance between the
arrestee and the area searched, and any restraints placed upon the
arrestee. 2°4  Under both of these tests, courts have recognized certain
situations which will allow a search to extend beyond the immediate
control of the arrestee.2 °5 These "exceptions' are based upon the
reasons which initially allow a warrantless search incident to arrest:
preservation of evidence 0 6 and protection of the arresting officer. 0 7
While neither the physical proximity test nor the factual analysis test
has become the prevailing test, there is some authority in post-Chimel
Supreme Court decisions which indicates that the Court would favor the
physical proximity test.208  However, since those cases dealt with the
scope of a search of a person incident to arrest and not the search of a
premises, they are weak authority upon which to determine that the
physical proximity test should be utilized in construing the immediate
control rule of Chimel.2 °9 In view of the fact that the factual analysis
test is more in accord with the underpinnings of Chimel,21 0 courts
should utilize it in examining searches of premises incident to arrest, at
least until such time as the Court may expressly reconsider its holding in
Chimel.
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204. See notes 87-119 supra and accompanying text.
205. See notes 121-75 supra and accompanying text.
206. See notes 121-48 supra and accompanying text.
207. See notes 149-75 supra and accompanying text.
208. See notes 176-201 supra and accompanying text.
209. See notes 199-200 supra and accompanying text.
210. See notes 79-86 supra and accompanying text.
